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As privatizações tendem a levar a um aumento da performance e eficiência das empresas bem 
como um melhoramento dos saldos orçamentais do estado, acompanhado de um aumento de 
concorrência (Carreira, Megginson e Netter, 2001). Desta forma, o objectivo do trabalho é 
estudar se as privatizações realizadas na última década, em Portugal e Espanha, foram 
realmente benéficas e se o processo de privatização se traduziu em melhorias para as 
empresas envolvidas. Este trabalho, suportado numa revisão de literatura de cerca de 60 
artigos, contempla uma comparação dos períodos pré e pós privatização, bem como uma 
comparação entre os indicadores das empresas privatizadas e das ainda empresas de capitais 
públicos. Procura-se ainda analisar o papel da estrutura de capital e a sua influência nas 
melhorias trazidas pelas privatizações. O estudo replica os métodos utilizados Omran, M. 
(2004) and McGuinness, P. and Ferguson, M. (2005). Os resultados mostram que não existe 
uma melhoria significativa de performance após a privatização, nem uma interferência da 
estrutura de capital, mas apenas uma melhoria da eficiência operacional. 
 
 







The privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) tend lead to an increase in performance 
and efficiency, an improvement in the fiscal budget, followed by an increase in competition. 
(Carreira and Megginson and Netter, 2001). The goal of this study is to analyse if the 
Portuguese and Spanish privatization processes, in order to determine if the privatizations 
done in the last decade really led to improvements among the privatized firms. The study, 
backed by a literary review of circa 60 publish articles, provides a comparison between the pre 
and post privatization periods of the privatized companies, as well as a comparison between 
the same privatized firms and existing SOEs. Furthermore, it is investigated the influence the 
capital structure may have in such improvements. This study replicates the methods used by 
Omran, M. (2004) and McGuinness, P. and Ferguson, M. (2005). The results show that there is 
no evidence of significant improvements in performance or any capital structure influence, but 
rather an improvement in operational efficiency. 
 
 



















The privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE), companies that are property of the state 
or in which the state is a shareholder, has been performed by several states throughout the 
world, and Europe was no exception. This study of the Portuguese and Spanish privatizations 
occurs due to their strong economic integration. By being open economies, the privatization is 
a means of promoting competitiveness, a way to attract investment, to increase the 
companies’ performance, and to reduce the state´s presence in the economy (Megginson, 
2010).  
 
Primarily, privatizations lead to an increase in performance and efficiency, an improvement in 
the fiscal budget, followed by an increase in competition. (Carreira and Megginson and Netter, 
2001). However, privatization by itself does not guarantee an improvement in performance, 
according to Omran, M. (2009), referring Zinnes, et al. (2001), but must be accompanied by an 
improvement in regulation and corporate governance (Bortolotti, D'souza, Fantinic, and 
Megginson, 2002). 
 
The goal of this study is to investigate, within the 55 companies listed on the PSI 20 and IBEX 
35, respectively the benchmark stock indexes of Portugal and Spain, if there is an improvement 
in performance within the companies, after privatization, and as well when compared to other 
existing SOEs. Additionally, it is investigated, for the same companies, if the capital structure 
influences the performance indicators. 
 
The results show that there was no significant performance increase after privatization, when 
comparing the companies on their own nor when comparing with existing SOEs. Moreover, the 
capital structure does not influence the performance, specifically the biggest qualified position 
or the state presence as an investor.  
 
The study is divided into four sections, the first being a literary review, the second presents in 
detail the sample and methodology employed, along with the hypotheses over which the 
study is developed. The third section presents an analysis of the results, and the fourth section 






1. Literature Review 
 
The State Owned Enterprises (SOE) are defined by the OECD as “business entities established 
by central and local governments, and whose supervisory officials are from the government, 
which include wholly state-funded firms and (…) ‘state-holding enterprises’ (..), those firms 
whose majority shares belong to the government”.  (OECD, 2009, pp.5 and 6). The state can as 
well still be present as a minority shareholder. To simplify, hereonafter the term SOE refers to 
all companies in which the State is shareholder. 
“In several OECD countries, State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) still represent a substantial part of 
GDP, employment and market capitalisation. Moreover, State-Owned Enterprises are often 
prevalent in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, transport and 
telecommunication, whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the 
population and to other parts of the business sector”. (OECD, 2005, pp.9). The SOEs are the 
only companies able to operate under natural monopolies (Shapiro and Willig, 1990 and 
Megginson and Netter, 2001), because “economies of scale provide a large cost advantage” to 
have all the products or services “provided by a single firm”. (Krugman and Wells (2005) pp. 
337). In Spain alone, in 2003, there were 62 SOEs and another 38 which had the state as a 
minority shareholder, representing an asset value of $ 10 billion, expressed in purchasing 
power parity. (OECD, 2005). 
The privatization of a SOE is “transforming a pure SOE into a private firm” expecting “to 
improve firm performance” since, “a pure SOE is not usually profit-oriented”. (Jiang, Yue and 
Zhao, 2009, pp. 2322). “The privatization process is the sale of public assets, namely of the 
SOEs to private agents” (Megginson and Netter, 2001, pp. 2), as a means for raising funds to 
improve both the state’s fiscal budget and the performance of the companies. (Shirley, 1999 
and Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2004). The privatization process contributes to the 
performance improvements, as well as to creating a free and competitive market. the 
privatization is a means, on the one hand of adding diversity, raising net results, encouraging 
investment in the market, and on the other hand, a way of increasing funds through share 
offerings. (Perotti and Oijen, 2001). 
 
1.1 The Goal of Privatizations 
A privatization of an SOE can be seen as a “broader policy-package that included economic 
reforms, liberalization and structural adjustment” (Doshi, 2000). The governments have been 
using privatizations as a measure of fiscal and budget expenses reduction and to satisfy 
specific requirements, like the public finance convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty 
requirements’ implementation. (Salmon, 2001). This was one of the reasons supporting the 
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privatizations in Portugal and Spain, in the late 20th century, so that the two countries could 
gain access to the Economic and Monetary Union, and later adopt the Euro as their currency. 
These privatization programmes are seen “primarily to raise revenue, in order to improve the 
economic efficiency of former state-owned enterprises and to develop the national stock 
markets”, (Megginson, 2010, pp.10), which prove to be an important regulation tool. 
(Bortolotti, D'souza, Fantinic, and Megginson, 2002 and Jiang, Yue and Zhao, 2009). This reality 
is supported as the “European governments have at least two-thirds of a trillion dollars worth 
of stakes in partially privatized that could be sold”. (Megginson, 2010), pp. 6, referring Ng and 
Bartsch, 2009). According to the OECD, the size of the SOEs in 2003 was 1,8 in a scale of 6 for 
Portugal and 2,6 out of 6 for Spain, and between the year 1990 and 2001 the privatization 
proceeds, in percentage of GDP, was already circa 26% for Portugal and circa 7.5% for Spain. 
(OECD, 2005). In the Spanish example, privatizations were undertaken to: “(i) raise revenue for 
the state; (ii) promote economic efficiency; (iii) reduce government interference in the 
economy; (iv) promote wider share ownership; (v) provide the opportunity to introduce 
competition; (vi) subject SOEs to market discipline; and (vii) develop the national capital 
market”. (Megginson, 2010, pp. 5). However, privatizations are not an automatic method of 
improving performance. (Omran, M., 2009 referring Zinnes, et al., 2001).  The “Spanish SOEs 
improved their efficiency and increased their real sales, capital expenditures and employment 
after going public, but not their profitability”. (Farinós, García and Ibáñez, 2007, pp. 368). 
Moreover, these gains in efficiency tend to be guaranteed if the majority of the equity is sold 
and not just a partial privatization, because a continued government involvement after the 
privatizations leave a re-nationalization option available. (D'souza, Megginson, and Nash, 2007 
referring Boycko et al., 1996). 
 
1.2  Methods of Privatization 
The privatizations normally involve public share offering and a subsequent listing on one of the 
indexes of the national stock exchanges. (Megginson, 2010, pp. 7). Hence, the same author 
identifies five general distinct ways of privatization. “These are (1) the direct sale of a company 
to another, existing firm or group of investors; (2) share issue privatizations (SIPs), which are 
public offerings of common stock to private investors on national and international stock 
markets; (3) voucher privatizations, involving the distribution of exchangeable purchase rights 
to citizens for free (or at nominal cost). These vouchers are then convertible directly into SOE 
shares; (4) the granting by governments of concessions to private companies, giving these firms 
the sole right to operate existing assets, and (5) public-private partnerships using project 
finance techniques to build new public assets using private capital.” The option of performing 
widespread privatisations is taken in an attempt to make the companies more efficient, more 
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result oriented and to solve any existing government failure. This market view makes way for 
an improvement in operational procedures and for a development of a corporate governance 
conscience.  
 
1.3  The Presence of Foreign Investors and Market Regulation 
Privatizations may be seen as a move from the governments to retreat to a regulatory 
position, leaving the market functioning independently (Perotti, 1995 referred by Perotti and 
Oijen, 2001). This withdraw represents the ending of the centralized ownership model, present 
in the Portuguese and Spanish SOEs, that run according to “a strong centralized ownership, (...) 
under the responsibility of one ministry of agency”. (OECD, 2005, pp. 49). The state’s pull-out 
allows a decrease of the scope, i.e. the extent, of the public sector in the economy, which was 
in 2003, 3,8 in a scale of 7 for Portugal and 3,5 out of 7 in Spain. (OECD, 2005). There is a 
benefit in opening the market, as the presence of foreign investors is decisive to the post-
privatization improvement. (Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter, 1999, along with Bortolotti, 
Jong, Nicodano, and Schindele, 2007). This is seen by the significantly higher return on equity 
or revenue per employee when foreign investors are among the shareholders. (Cin, and 
Vodopivec, 1997 and Anderson, Makhija, and Spiro, 1997, referred by D'Souza, Megginson, 
and Nash, 2007). To ensure the confidence of foreign investors there must be a legal 
framework in place, which is decisive to guarantee stability and consistency of the stock 
markets, essential in promoting growth and to attract further foreign funds. (Boubakri and 
Hamza, 2007 referring Black, 2001 and Coffee, 1999 and Mizutani, 2010). Privatizations in 
developed countries benefit from the work of the regulatory agencies, which contribute to the 
protection of shareholders and investors, as well for a stable investment environment. 
(Boubakri and Hamza, 2007). This is corroborated by findings that say that a strong and active 
regulation increases competition and foreign investment within the market, are major factors 
for productivity increase. (Okten and Arin, 2006, stating Wallsten, 2001, and Kikeri and Nellis, 
2004). Competition “can greatly improve monitoring possibilities and hence increase incentives 
for production efficiency. Private firms are more efficient than SOEs in competitive 
environments. On the other hand, in non-competitive industries or in industries with natural 
monopoly elements, the performance of privatized firms is ambiguous, and results from 
empirical studies are inconclusive.” (Omran, M., 2004, pp. 1023). The increase in productivity 
and efficiency may also arise because the governing board is subject to the market conditions, 
the financial markets, and the close supervision of the shareholders, whose income and wealth 
depend on the performance of the companies. (Omran, M., 2004). Being present in the stock 
markets, and released from government control, the newly privitized companies may benefit 
from many new opportunities of investment and development of new projects. The increase in 
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efficiency makes privatized companies show a significant reduction in the debt levels and an 
increase in dividend payout. (Brada and Ma, 2007 refering Megginson et al., 1994). This fact 
develops further the capital markets and gives the confidence that private agents need to 
invest. (Frydman et al., 1999 referred by Okten and Arin 2006).  
 
1.4 Agency Problems within the SOEs 
The privatization process can be the solution for problems related to the agency theory, and 
information asymmetry. The privatizations “can mitigate the agency problems that bog down 
state owned enterprises, such as goal ambiguity, weak monitoring of managers, and ineffective 
managerial incentives, but it does not solve government failures associated with regulation”. 
(Ramamurti, 1997, pp. 1175, using the work of Aharoni, 1982 and Wolf, 1988). It is the state’s 
transition from an executive position to a regulation role, promoting a free market and 
competition. By deepening the ties between ownership and shareholders’ control a shift to a 
market orientated perspective occurs, and increases the prospect of performance 
improvements and insures a consistent return on the shareholders’ investment. (Okten, 2006). 
Other authors have corroborated it by determining that the SOEs privatization can 
complement market failures adjusting the policies to improve production and performance, 
and thus transforming a SOE into a private company with a strong market and profit oriented 
conduct. The “modern history of public ownership” (...) suggest “that it leads to lower levels of 
efficiency in SOEs than would be possible under private ownership, and these inefficient state-
owned enterprises, in turn, are seen as creating other problems such as pre-emption of 
government revenues through subsidies or recapitalization and efforts by SOEs to obtain 
special protection from private competitors”. (Brada and Ma, 2007, pp. 122). 
Another point of view regarding the companies’ ownership focuses on the dangers of mixed 
ownership between the government and private investors. (Oum, Adlerb, and Yu, 2006). There 
is a conflict between the government and the shareholders’ interests and strategies, meaning 
that the former tries to ensure a maximization of wealfare to society while the latter works to 
maximize profit. (Bos, 1991, and Boardman and Vinning, 1989). “On one hand, mixed 
ownership may facilitate the role of the government as a ‘‘steward’’ in private firms that are 
dominated by a strategic investor or where there is a lack of market discipline. On the other 
hand, mixed ownership arrangements may blend the worst qualities of government and private 
ownership”, allows for a rise in agency problems related to information asymmetry and to a 
deviation from a profit oriented strategy and increase in performance. (Oum, Adlerb, and Yu, 
2006, pp. 110). It “may take the form of an inefficient use of the free cash flow through 
wasteful but politically valuable acquisitions. Managers can deviate from decisions that are 
optimal for shareholders and politicians may deviate from the policies that are optimal for 
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voters. Between the inability of shareholders to fully control managers and the inability of 
voters to fully control politicians”. (Bel and Trillas, 2005, pp.43). 
One option can be transferring ownership to an agent who is already inside the company. 
Although this transfer of control creates a more confident prospect of corporate improvement, 
due to the extensive knowledge of the firms operations, it has a disadvantage in terms of 
limiting the management restructuring options and in profitability increase. In comparison 
with an external purchaser, these limitations are practically nonexistent, allowing a deeper 
restructure after acquisition from the government. (Huang and Wang, 2010, referring 
Bebchuk, 1994).  
The incentives given to the management team are an important tool to line up the 
shareholders’ actions with the companies’ interests, with a goal of achieving performance and 
efficiency improvements. The managers’ base salary is normally determined by benchmark 
with other companies and the incentives take the form of bonuses based on the companies’ 
performance indicators, namely the earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), net results, 
earnings per share (EPS) and the economic value added (EVA). In addition to this accounting 
figures linkage, there are other forms of variable income like stock options. These bonuses 
constitute the variable portion of the annual income and the sole part that is directly linked to 
the company’s performance. (Kim and Nofsinger, 2007). This may be viewed, for the most 
part, as a trigger of corporate growth and prosperity. However, the “tools that align incentives 
to performance are available to both private firms and SOEs. For instance, SOE managers could 
be motivated to improve firm performance through incentive compensation based on 
achievement of certain targets, with poor-performing managers being punished through 
demotion or dismissals”. (Lin and Su, 2009, referring Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Cragg and 
Dyck, 2003). 
“Private investors often have strong incentives to monitor management, select CEOs based on 
their industry expertise and adopt incentive pay schemes to align the interests of executives 
and shareholders' value”. (Huang and Wang, 2010, pp. 2).  
This may be more evident in private companies where there is bigger management board 
stability, a long-term commitment, and bigger control by the shareholders. In the SOEs, the 
managers are normally appointed based on political trust. “Several studies (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997 and Dyck, 2001) assert that corporate governance can have an impact on the 
performance of privatized firms”. “The gains in performance” are “higher when the 
government gives up control”. (Huang and Wang, 2010 referring Boycko et al., 1996). The 
conclusions indicate a better performance both in results and in the stock markets if the 
political risk is low. (Levine and Zervos, 1998, La Porta et al., 1989 referred by Perotti and Van 




1.5 Pricing the Privatizations 
To privatize a company the state must determine the price at which the company is sold. The 
governments may make a “tender offer”, do a “bookbuilding exercise”1, or “set a fixed price” 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). There is evidence that the governments will under-price their 
offer (set a lower price than the real market value of the company) of the initial selling portion 
of an SOE company in an attempt to incentive investors, and to signal the market that will not 
try to delay future operations of the privatized company. (Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter, 
1999 referring Perotti, 1995). However, “(i) if future policy uncertainty is low, market oriented 
governments will offer small portions of SOEs in initial partial sales with little or no under-
pricing; (ii) when future policy uncertainty is high, market-oriented governments will under-
price initial sales of large portions of SOEs; (iii) market-oriented governments that cannot 
commit will ration these under-priced shares to domestic investors and employees in ‘fixed-
price offers’; (iv) populist governments will resist under-pricing because they are impatient and 
prefer the proceeds; and (v) the level of under-pricing will increase with the income inequality 
in a country”. (Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter, 1999, pp. 224). On the same topic, “a 
committed government is motivated to signal its identity because: (i) The sale of the SOE will 
yield higher proceeds if private investors believe the government is committed. (ii) The 
economic benefits of private ownership will begin immediately since managers perceive that 
committed governments will not expropriate the profits from their private efforts”. (Jones, 
Megginson, Nash and Netter, 1999, pp. 221, referring Biais and Perotti, 1997). Governments 
which adopt a ‘populist’ conduct are very strict about the price per share and often are not 
eager to negotiate the price of a share issue privatization or of an initial public offering, trying 
to raise the maximum revenue possible. (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Generally, the former 
SOE companies present in the main stock indexes reveal a higher under-pricing when selling 
the first tranche, than when selling the subsequent tranches. In contrast, a lower under-pricing 
(higher selling price) is set if the company is not sold through a public offering. This shows that 
if the company’s first tranche is sold through a public offering, it will secure a larger discount 
and a smaller discount with the following tranches’ sale, and this way maximizing its revenue. 
(Bel, 1998).  
 
 
1.6 The Selling Method 
                                                 
1
 “Bookbuilding involves the submitting of (legally) non-binding bids by a relatively exclusive group of institutional investors. The 
book manager, in consultation with the issuing company, uses this crude approximation of the market demand curve to establish 
the price at which the share offering is sold and exercises considerable discretion in the allocation of shares”. WHILHEM, William J., 
Jr. (2005). “Bookbuilding, Auctions, and the Future of the IPO Process”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 17:1, pp.3. 
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After the price setting negotiations, the process of share allocation is crucial. The state can sell 
the shares in bulk or in tranches. If the second is the chosen method, the state must determine 
the quantity of shares it wants to sell at the initial offer and at the succeeding offers. It is 
suggested that the sale process should be divided in tranches to ensure an effective control 
transfer. (Megginson and Netter, 2001). The sale programs “are initially gradual, even when 
retained stakes are explicitly targeted to be sold over a few years. Proceeds from privatization 
increase over time, suggesting gradual selling calibrated to build investors’ confidence”. 
(Perotti and Guney, 1993, referred by Perotti and Oijen, 2001, pp. 49). The Spanish and 
Portuguese governments have historically adopted the selling process through public offering 
made in tranches, over a number of years. 
The privatization can be done while still allowing for a mixed ownership with the government 
and the introduction of corporate control restrictions (Megginson and Netter, 2001), such as 
golden shares. The golden share figure was present in several Portuguese and Spanish 
companies, in which the state still has a presence, benefiting from special powers as member 
of the board. This mechanism was created to protect these companies from foreign hostile 
takeover actions, guaranteeing national sovereignty, usually for companies in strategic sectors. 
By using instruments such as golden shares the government encourages market distortion, 
(Salmon, 2001), allowing for unilateral dismissal of management board decisons through veto 
power. (Omran, M., 2004 referring D’souza, Megginson, and Nash, 2001).  
 
1.7 The Post-privatization Period 
The existence of competitors and the regulatory framework is essential to ensure that the 
original objectives of the privatization are executed and achieved. One example is the 
reduction of monopolies, promoting profitability and efficiency through competition. 
(Ramamurti, 1997, D’Souza, Megginson, and Nash, 2005 according to Djankov and Murrell, 
2002). This fact is corroborated as privatizations subject the companies to market competition, 
a crucial factor for success and post-privatization performance improvements. (Newbery and 
Pollitt, 1997, World Bank, 1995, and Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). The post-privatization phase is 
essential to determine the success of the privatization and to ensure the future profitability of 
the newly privatized company. (Davis, Ossowski, Richardson, and Barnet, 2000, referred by 
Birdsall and Nellis, 2003). An IMF review of “18 privatizing countries reports substantial gross 
receipts from privatization, accounting for nearly 2% of annual GDP”. (Comstock, Kish, and 
Vasconcellos, 2003) referring Megginson et al., 1994). They also find that by comparing pre 
and post-privatization scenarios, the latter leads to improvements in performance and 
efficiency, already discussed above, as well as an increase in stock prices in the medium run. 
However, if this contributes to job uncertainty, the process may be postponed to protect the 
14 
 
employees, acknowledging the labour unions which typically are against any privatization. 
(Asiedu and Folmer, 2007). In the same line of work, a study of the productivity of the 500 
non-U.S. industrial firms for the year of 1983 found that there was a significant connection 
between private companies and growth. The results suggest that private ownership leads to 
higher rates of productivity growth and declining costs in the long run, regardless of the 
competitive and regulatory environments. (Boardman and Vining, 1989, referred by Brada and 
Ma, 2007). In a study of the OECD member counties, and another of the develop countries  the 
results show that there were improvements in performance and efficiency. (D’Souza, 
Megginson, and Nash, 2005, and Boubakri et al., 2005). They found that, apart from the 
ownership influence, the stock market development and its trading volume are also important 
factors in improving performance and efficiency. The more sophisticated the markets, the 
more likely efficiency and performance are improved. Academic research “has documented 
that the intensity of the capital market pressure depends upon the size and sophistication of 
the nation’s financial system”. (D’Souza, Megginson, and Nash, 2005, pp. 750). The same 
authors present several empirical studies which identified that the company’s performance 
after the privatization differs considerably, depending on the degree of market competiveness 
and regulation. In fact, “institutional development is key to successful economic transition and 
development”. (D’Souza, Megginson, and Nash, 2005, pp. 761). Associated to this development 
of the financial markets the companies’ leverage levels drop significantly. (Megginson, and 
Nash, 2005 signaling the work of Megginson et al., 1994). 
In spite of several studies indicating that privatizations ultimately lead to an increase in 
efficiency and performance, there are a growing number of authors who say that privatization 
by itself does not mean an automatic improvement. (Omran, M., 2009). Hence, the results are 
contradictory and not very conclusive. “Under competitive market conditions, government 
ownership is not inherently less efficient than private ownership, and that competition is the 
key to efficiency rather than ownership per se”. (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991 referred by Oum, 
Adlerb, and Yu, 2006, pp. 110. 
 
1.8 Corporate Governance after Privatization 
One major factor that typically changes with privatization is the corporate governance of the 
newly privatized companies. Corporate Governance is a set of “laws, institutions, practices, 
and regulations that determine how limited-liability companies will be run and in whose 
interest”. (Megginson and Netter, 2001, pp. 43). Among other definitions, corporate 
governance can be viewed as well, as the way to encourage the managerial board to act in a 
way to maximize the shareholder’s return, and the goal of eliminating the agency costs that 
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naturally occur between the shareholders and the management board. (Omran, M., 2009 and 
Boubakri, Cosseta, and Guedhami, 2004). 
The privatization process is an opportunity to change the company’s corporate governance 
policy. As the OECD suggests, “improvements in the governance in state owned enterprises are 
expected to promote growth through better performance and increased productivity. If fully 
implemented, they should lead to a more transparent allocation of resources and a more 
effective supervision and management of enterprises”. (OECD, 2005). The governance changes 
are important to guarantee a higher post-privatization success. (Kočenda and Hanousek, 
working paper October/2010). The shareholders’ prosperity depends on the performance of 
the company. This fact makes the shareholders more dedicated to control and monitor the 
management, especially foreign shareholders, and to make sure the plans are executed 
efficiently (Okten, 2006 referring Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Boubakri et al., 2005 and 
Frydman et al., 1999 and Villalonga, 2000). If the ownership is very disperse, a steady 
corporate ownership is difficult to achieve, increasing the assymetric information between 
shareholders and managers.  (Boubakri, Cosseta, and Guedhami, 2004). This dispersal pattern 
is in part result of shareholders who do not wish to retain a stake in the company, re-selling 
the stock right after (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Frequently, these dispersal transactions 
are also promoted by the state itself to atract small shareholders to encourage market 
investment. It must be pointed out that “since the long-run returns to investors in SIPs2 are 
generally positive, the first experience of these new retail investors in stock market trading is a 
positive one”. (Boubakri, Cosseta, and Guedhami, 2004, pp. 46). In addition, governments 
manage to encourage many of the original investors to come back for subsequent share 
offerings. The presence of long-lasting investors or those whose intention is merely financial 
depends also on the level of legal protection for their investment. Hence, a legal system that 
“protects investors is presumably a determinant of the success of privatization in improving 
firm performance” (Megginson and Netter, 2001, pp. 44). The changes in corporate 
governance may occur beforehand, and the government may want to reorganize certain 
characteristics of the company such as “restabilising relationships with strategic foreign 
investors or implementing employee share ownership plans, and/or through restructurings 
such as acquisitions, divestitures, or re-capitalizations”. (D'souza, Megginson, and Nash, 2007, 
pp. 158).   
Under government control, the management board is often appointed for political reasons. 
The objectives are “vaguely defined, and tend to change as the political situation and relative 
strengths of different interest groups”. (Oum, Adlerb, and Yu, 2006). Under private ownership, 
the management is replaced with others more professional and competent, leading to 
                                                 
2 Share issue privatization. 
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immediate performance expansion. (Megginson et al., 1994). “Corporate governance changes 
(brought on by different upper management) will positively impact the degree of post-
privatization performance improvement”. (D'Souza, Megginson, and Nash, 2007, pp. 160). The 
privatization process provides an opportunity to introduce new incentives and control 
mechanisms that motivate the managers to thrive and lead the companies to improvements. 
(Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2004). The objectives pursued are different depending on 
the type of company. An SOE will typically follow the orientation of the government in office, 
which may trail conflicting agendas and setting multiple and sometimes conflicting goals. “The 
government’s goals can be inconsistent with efficiency, inconsistent with maximizing social 
welfare, or even malevolent”. (Megginson and Netter, 2001 referring Laffont and Tirole, 1993 
and Shleifer, 1998). 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
It appears to be consensual that with privatization comes as an improvement in performance, 
allowing for an alignment with a market orientation view. Although privatization on its own 
does not guarantee improvements, this new view introduced by private investors leads to 
improvements in corporate governance and regulation, both internal and external, dealing as 
well with potential agency problems that may occur. Hence, the capital structure can influence 
the performance of privatized firms. 
The aim of the study is to search for an improvement within privatized firms’ performance, and 
to compare it to the performance of other existing SOEs. At the same time, it is also attempted 
to determine if the capital structure after privatization, the privatization process itself, and the 
presence of the state as a shareholder, influence the performance indicators. 
 
2.1 Data 
The companies analysed are those listed on the Portuguese and Spanish benchmark stock 
indexes PSI 20 and IBEX 35, respectively. The data used is obtained from the Amadeus and 
Bankscope Systems, annual reports and stock market information. The data used is from the 
years of 2003 and 2006 when comparing the pre and post privatization periods. When 
analysing the capital structure, the data retrieved is from the years of 2005, 2007 and 2009. 
The total number of companies present in the sample is 55. The sample contains 33 privately 
owned companies, 7 in which the state is present and 15 privatized companies. The sample is 
very diverse as it encompasses a variety of companies from different industries, including the 
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financial institutions. During the last decade only 4 companies were privatized in the same 
years. 2 companies were privatized in 2003 and other 2 in 2006. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
Using the information collected on each of the 55 companies present in the sample, two 
distinct methodologies are used in trying to asses if the privatization leads to improvements in 
performance and to see if the same performance is influenced by capital structure. These 
methodologies are based on the works of Omran, M. (2004) and McGuinness, P. and Ferguson, 
M (2005), respectively. 
 
 
In accordance to the literature review, the privatization of an SOE is undertaken with the 
expectation of an improvement in performance and efficiency. “Privatization that allows the 
sale of voting shares - possibly giving control to outside investors - is most conducive to 
efficiency improvements”. (Omran, M., 2006, pp. 1025). In addition, it was found that “private 
firms are significantly more profitable and efficient than SOEs and mixed-ownership 
enterprise”. (Boardman and Vining, 1989, and Vining and Boardman, 1992, referred by Omran, 
M., 2004, pp. 1024) Therefore, this study examines if the privatization of an SOE improves 
performance.  
 Hypothesis 1: The privatization of an SOE improves its performance. 
 
The analysis employs the methodology originally introduced by Megginson et al. (1994), and 
subsequently applied by Omran, M. (2004) to the Egyptian economy, beginning with the 
comparison between the means of pre and post-privatization periods, within the companies, 
followed by a comparison with SOEs of the same industry or size, in terms of total assets. This 
comparison between companies is made using two distinct approaches: Absolute Performance 
Differential (APC) and Relative Performance Differential (RPC). The absolute differential 
approach requires the absolute accounting figures, while the relative approach requires the 
indicators’ relative growth rate for the period. The intention is to investigate if the means of 
newly privatized firms differ from the state owned enterprises. This analysis was originally 
developed for the period between 1994 and 1998, with a sample of 55 newly privatized 
Egyptian companies and another 54 state owned enterprises that constituted the control 
group used for comparison. (Omran, M., 2004).  
The variables included in the study were the profitability variables EBIT (Earnings Before 
Interest and Tax), ROS (Return on Sales), ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity). 
The latter three are calculated by dividing the EBIT by sales, total assets and equity, 
18 
 
respectively. (Omran, M., 2004). Furthermore, there were operational variables included 
which represented sales efficiency (SALEFF: sales per employee) and income efficiency (INEFF: 
EBIT per employee). In addition, the analysis includes also the labour force represented by the 
number of employees (EMPL) and the Leverage (TDTA) computed as the total debt over total 
assets. (Omran, M., 2004). The means of each variable were calculated for the two year period 
prior to the privatization and after the privatization, excluding the privatization year. (Omran, 
M., 2004).  
 
This same methodology is now applied to the Portuguese and Spanish companies with the 
same variables. Among the 55 Portuguese and Spanish companies present in the sample 
referred earlier, only five were privatized in the last decade. From those five only four were 
considered because the privatizations occurred in the same year (2003 and 2006). This is done 
to achieve a sample size bigger than one. Hence, the sample was divided in two groups: two 
companies which were privatized in 2003 (EBRO Foods PLC and Portucel SGPS) and two which 
were privatized in 2006 (GALP Energia SGPS and ZON Multimédia SGPS). The control group is 
composed by SOEs with similar size, i.e. total assets (Enagas S.A. and Red Electrica S.A for 2003 
and Bolsas y Mercados Españoles S.A. and INAPA SGPS for 2006), since there weren’t any SOEs 
of the same industry listed in either indexes. The means used to apply the methodology were 
calculated for the three years prior (-3) and after (+3) the privatization years of 2003 and 2006.  
The methodology of privatized/SOE company comparison is as follows:  
o Absolute Performance Differential Approach:,                   
o Relative Performance Differential Approach:                             
The APC is the absolute performance change, RPC is the relative performance change,      is 
the mean performance of each variable in the post-privatization period, and        the mean 
performance change of each variable in the pre-privatization period. (Omran, M., 2004). 
 
The variables present in the methodology are the same used by Omran, M. (2004) and are as 
follows: 
Profitability Variables  
 EBIT: It is the Earnings Before Interest and Tax of each company.  
 ROS: The Return on Sales is calculated as the EBIT over the Sales for each year. 
 ROA: The Return on Assets is calculated as the EBIT over Total Assets for each year.  
 ROE: The Return on Equity is calculated as the EBIT over Total Equity for each year.  
Operational Variables 
 SALEFF: This variable represents the Sales per Employee. It is calculated as the Total 
Sales over Total number of Employees.  
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 INEFF: This variable presents the EBIT per Employee. It is calculated as EBIT over the 
Total Number of Employees. 
 EMPL: EMPL represents the number of employees of each company.  
Financial Variables 
 TDTA: This variable is the leverage ratio. It is calculated as Total Debt over Total 
Assets.  
 
Another point raised in the literature review was the influence of the capital structure on the 
company’s performance. Although, “companies with private-sector stakeholders enjoy benefits 
in terms of increased return on equity and a lower cost of capital”, a “mixed ownership 
arrangements may blend the worst qualities of government and private ownership”, not 
assuring an elimination of political interference. (McGuinness, P. and Ferguson, M, 2005; Oum, 
Adlerb, and Yu, 2006, pp. 110 and Omran, M., 2009, respectivelly). A company released from 
government control, may benefit from many new opportunities of investment. (Brada and Ma, 
2007). As a result, this study investigates the influence of the capital structure on the 
performance.  
 Hypothesis 2:  The performance is influenced by capital structure. 
 
 
This hypothesis attempts to provide evidence about the relation between the capital structure, 
shareholder concentration and performance. This is relevant after the privatization process 
because in several companies the State remains as a minority shareholder, which may still 
influence the performance of the company. 
To analyse this hypothesis an OLS regression model is used in order to determine if the capital 
structure, notably with a presence of the State as shareholder, contributes to higher earnings 
per share, compared to the entirely private companies. To study this possible influence, the 
model first used by McGuinness, P. and Ferguson, M. (2005) on the Chinese market is 
employed. The original model was employed to explain the relationship between ownership 
structure and profitability, when foreign investors began acquiring equity of several Chinese 
SOEs. The study was conducted for the year of 2003. The sample was originally formed by 66 
Chinese, listed both in the stock exchanges of the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong S.A.R. 
(Special Administrated Region of the People’s Republic of China). These companies remained, 
at the time, with a state presence in their capital structures. The study was able to determine 
that when the majority shareholder increases its dominance, corporate performance tends to 
decrease, and that there are indications of a positive association between corporate 




To apply this methodology to the Portuguese and Spanish markets, it is required some variable 
modifications to ensure adequate adherence to the available data. It is added the variable 
SHARECON which represents the percentage of equity by the biggest capital qualified position. 
Three independent moments in time are analysed. The study is undertaken for the years of 
2005, 2007 and 2009. In this methodology, the number of companies varies according to those 
referred earlier. For 2005 some of the companies were not listed in the indexes and therefore 
reducing the sample to 46. For the years 2007 and 2009 the sample is comprised of the 55 and 
53 companies, respectively.  
 
The OLS model is as follows: 
                                              
                  
 
The explanatory variables used represent the factors that may influence the performance 
variable earnings per share. The variables SHARECON, STATE and PRIV provide the evidence of 
the relationship between capital structure, privatization and performance. The variables VOL, 
SIZE, FIN, and NYSE serve a control purpose. 
 
 The variables are as follows: 
 EPS: Represents the earnings per share for the year.  
 STATE: Dummy variable being 1 if the company has the State as a shareholder, and 
0 if it is privately owned. 
 PRIV: Dummy variable being 1 if the company was privatized, and 0 if it was not. 
 SHARECON: Represents the concentration of shareholders stated as percentage of 
the equity of the biggest capital qualified position. 
 VOL: Represents the total share trading volume of each company on the PSI20 and 
IBEX35, in billions of shares, for the year. 
 SIZE: Represents the net revenue of the previous year, stated in millions of Euros. 
 IND: Dummy variable being 1 if the company is in the Industrial, Construction and 
Energy sectors. 






3. Empirical Results 
In this section the empirical results of both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are stated, analysing 
the performance improvements after privatization and the influence of the capital structure on 
performance.  
For hypothesis 1, the analysis begins by presenting the expected variable signs for the means 
paired samples comparison t-test, followed by the explanation of the test results carried out 
for the years of 2003 and 2006. The comparison is made for the three-year period prior and 
after the privatization of the privatized companies EBRO Foods S.A. and Portucel SGPS for 2003 
and GALP Energía SGPS and ZON Multimédia SGPS for 2006 (table 1). The sample is comprised 
of only 2 companies for each year because these were the only companies privatized in the 
same years during the last decade.  
Subsequently, a comparison is made between the same privatized companies and other 
existing SOEs that have the same size in terms of total assets (tables 2, 3, 4 and 5). The same 
test is repeated using a larger sample of SOEs. For the year 2003, 4 SOEs were used and for 
2006, 5 were used. These were the SOEs listed on the PSI 20 and IBEX 35 for which there was 
available data. In spite of the slightly larger number of companies, the sample size is a weak 
spot in this study. 
For hypothesis 2, an OLS regression used to study the influence of the capital structure on the 
performance of a company. The analysis begins with the signs expectation for each one of the 
variable coefficients, followed by the interpretation of the actual results of the regression. 
There are three distinct regressions, one for 2005, another for 2007 and another for 2009 
using the companies listed on both the PSI 20 and the IBEX 33. 
 
3.1   Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis in this study tests the performance improvement after the privatization of 
an SOE.  
 
3.1.1 The Expected Sign 
The privatization process, which reduces the presence of the state on the equity of the SOEs, is 
expected to bring broad improvements to the company. In terms of profitability it is likely that 
there will be an improvement of the EBIT. With this progress it is expected to improve the ROS, 
ROA, and ROE, as they are computed using the EBIT. 
These improvements also spread out to operational indicators and therefore it is also expected 
that the sales efficiency (SALEFF) and the income efficiency (INEFF) indicators increase after 
the privatization, due to a better resource usage in a more competitive environment. Within 
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the operational indicators, the one with a less probable behaviour is the number of employees 
(EMPL). Normally, privatization “increase incentives for production efficiency”. (Omran, M., 
2004, pp. 1023). The financial variable present in this methodology is the level of total debt in 
terms of total assets (TDTA). The SOEs have access to more favourable borrowing conditions 
granted by the State, which lead to a steady debt build up. Once the privatization is complete, 
borrowing costs will be the same as the private companies, leading to a decrease in debt 
levels, and therefore a reduction in the debts levels after privatization is expected. (Omran, M., 
2004).  
These behaviours are corroborated by other studies, which state that post-privatization 
scenarios lead to improvements in performance as well as in efficiency. (Comstock, Kish, and 
Vasconcellos, 2003 and Omran, M., 2006). 
 
3.1.2 Result Analysis 
The results of the pre and post-privatization comparison (table 1) for 2003 show a slight 
increase in almost every indicator, in terms of absolute figures. The only indicators that do not 
increase after privatization are return on sales (ROS) and the EBIT per employee (INEFF). The 
EBIT, the ROS decreases, the ROA increases, and the ROE increases and are not statistically 
significant at a 5% level. The difference of SALEFF is one of the few statistically significant at 5% 
level, with a t-statistic of 55,743 and a p-value of 0.006. The EMPL difference is not statistically 
significant. The EBIT per employee difference (INEFF) registers stagnation and subsequently is 
not statistically significant.  The financial indicator total debt over total assets (TDTA) increases 
slightly after privatization, as the other indicators do and it is not statistically significant at a 5% 
level. These results are in line with what was expected, except for the ROS and TDTA variables 
that were supposed to increase and decrease, respectively, after the privatization, as more 
favourable borrowing conditions become unavailable. 
 
The results for the 2006 privatized companies are similar to those of 2003. As in the previous 
period, there is an increase in the work force (EMPL) and in the debt as percentage of the 
assets (TDTA). Most of the profitability variables increased, in absolute figures. The EBIT, ROA 
and ROE increased after privatization, but neither variable are statistically significant at 5% 
level. All these three variable differences show the expected behaviour expressed earlier. The 
operational variables followed the same path, except for INEFF which decreased slightly. The 
sales per employee (SALEFF) increased after privatization. However, these differences are not 
statistically significant. These behaviours correspond to what was expected, except for the ROS 
and INEFF variable, which should increase after privatization. The last variable, total debt over 
total assets (TDTA) showed an increase but its difference is not statistically significant at the 
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5% level. This fact is not expected, as privatization makes the public borrowing instruments 
unavailable. 
 
From these results it can be seen that for these companies that have been listed in the stock 
market indexes for some time, the difference in the profitability indicators is not statistically 
significant and only the operational variables appear to benefit from the privatization process.  
 
 























*Table1 shows the results of the test that tries to determine if there are differences between the means of the three years prior 
and after the privatization process of the companies EBRO Foods and Portucel SGPS, for the year of 2003, and for GALP Energia 
SGPS and ZON Multimédia, for the year of 2006. It is used a dependent t-test for paired samples in order to compare the means 
of each sample. It is shown the number of companies studied for each year, the mean of each indicator for the three years prior 
to privatization, the mean for the three years after the privatization, the t-statistic and the p-values. The null hypothesis is that 
the means of the post-privatization companies are equal to the means of pre privatization period. The alternative hypothesis is 
that the means are different (H0: μ1 = μ2; H1: μ1 ≠ μ2). The results were reported using Microsoft Excel software. 
 
 
After the comparison of the pre and post-privatization periods, a comparison between 
privatized and SOE companies was made to see if there are significant differences in the 
performance (table 2). To achieve this goal the comparisons are based on two approaches, the 
Absolute Performance Differential Approach (APC) and the Relative Performance Differential 
Approach (RPC). The results are stated in table 2. Both were applied to the two companies 
privatized in 2003 and the two privatized in 2006. The SOEs chosen are those with a similar 










EBIT 2 189459.333 153883.333 0.524 0.346
ROS 2 0.118 0.142 -0.491 0.355
ROA 2 0.074 0.071 0.117 0.463
ROE 2 0.103 0.074 0.631 0.321
Sales  per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 415.105 324.739 55.743 0.006
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 51.586 51.583 0.000 0.500
Employees  (EMPL) 2 4617.833 4417.833 0.734 0.298
Total  Debt over Total  Assets  (TDTA) 2 0.334 0.212 7.544 0.042





EBIT 2 316564.667 267490.167 0.791 0.287
ROS 2 0.082 0.102 -1.204 0.221
ROA 2 0.101 0.086 0.358 0.391
ROE 2 0.126 0.086 0.603 0.327
Sales  per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 1207.517 1027.590 1.947 0.151
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 73.907 74.106 -0.021 0.493
Employees  (EMPL) 2 4264.333 3712.500 0.677 0.311
Total  Debt over Total  Assets  (TDTA) 2 0.301 0.258 0.900 0.267
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Table 2 – Absolute Performance Differential Approach (performance comparison between privatized companies  












* This comparison between privatized companies and SOE of similar size is made using the absolute performance differential 
(APC). The absolute differential approach requires the absolute accounting figures. The results were computed using the 
following:                   , where APC is the absolute performance change,     is the mean performance of each variable in 
the post-privatization period, and       the mean performance change of each variable in the pre-privatization period. It is used 
a t-test for paired samples, to compare the two samples. The samples are formed by the two companies privatized in 2003 and 
2006 along with the correspondent 2 SOEs that show similar total assets. The null hypothesis is the performance means of the 
privatized companies are equal to the performance means of SOE. The alternative hypothesis is that the means are different (H0: 
μ1 = μ2; H1: μ1 ≠ μ2). The results were reported using Microsoft Excel software. 
 
The first approach (APC) shows that for 2003, the means of privatized companies’ profitability 
variables (EBIT, ROS, ROA and ROE) are lower. By looking at the t-statistic of each value and 
the corresponding p-value, it can be seen that none of the differences are statistically 
significant at a 5% level, except the ROS, which mean the difference is significant. When 
analysing the operational variables, sales per employee (SALEFF) registers a higher absolute 
figure. Although there is a difference in means, it is not statistically significant at a 5% level. 
The EBIT per employee (INEFF) sharply decreases, for privatized companies, which is 
statistically significant at 5%. The number of employees (EMPL) registers approximately the 
same figure for each group and its difference in means is not statistically significant at a 5% 
level. The total debt over total assets (TDTA) decreases showing a smaller level of debt for 
privatized companies. Its difference, as most of the other differences, is not statistically 
significant at a 5% level. The variables have the expected behaviour, except for the ROS and 
INEFF which decrease. 
 
The 2006 privatized companies follow the same behaviour of those privatized in 2003. The 
only statistically significant difference is the TDTA, but at a 10% p-value level. As in 2003, the 
sales were higher for the privatized companies than for the SOEs. Although the sale per 
employee (SALEFF) variable favours the privatized companies, the difference between the 
companies’ means is not statistically significant at 5%. In terms of EBIT per employee (INEFF), 
2003 Number of Companies Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 35576.000 170060.167 -1.672 0.172
ROS 2 -0.048 0.168 -11.824 0.027
ROA 2 0.003 0.015 -1.714 0.168
ROE 2 0.029 0.063 -0.952 0.258
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 90.366 -541.704 1.030 0.245
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 0.003 126.553 -6.872 0.046
Employees (EMPL) 2 200.000 204.667 -0.011 0.496
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 0.122 0.312 -2.271 0.132
2006 Number of Companies Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 49074.500 64820.333 -0.131 0.458
ROS 2 -0.020 0.078 -1.122 0.232
ROA 2 -0.005 0.005 -0.493 0.354
ROE 2 -0.018 0.101 -0.765 0.292
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 179.927 107.669 0.403 0.378
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 -0.200 86.376 -0.954 0.258
Employees (EMPL) 2 551.833 -59.833 0.699 0.306
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 0.043 -0.103 3.533 0.088
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the differential is smaller than that of the SOEs. Apparently, the privatization led to a decrease 
in the number of employees, though not big enough to be statistically significant. The level of 
debt as percentage of the total assets (TDTA) is higher for privatized companies, but the mean 
differential is not statistically significant at a 5% level, but only at 10% level. In 2003 the only 
variables which have the predicted behaviour are SALEFF and TDTA. In 2006 the only variable 
with the predicted behaviour is SALEFF. All the other variables contradict the predicted 
behaviour. 
 
After completing this test, the same test was repeated using a larger sample. The SOEs used 
were raised from 2 to 4 in 2003 and raised to 5 in 2006. The results are shown in table 3. The 
SOEs used were the ones listed in the indexes and the ones for which there was available data.  
 


















*This comparison between privatized companies and all SOEs with available data is made using the relative performance 
differential (RPC). The relative differential approach requires the absolute accounting figures. The results were computed using 
the following:                           , where RPC is the absolute performance change,     is the mean performance of 
each variable in the post-privatization period, and       the mean performance change of each variable in the pre-privatization 
period. It is used a t-test to compare the two samples. The samples are formed by the two companies privatized in 2003 and 
2006 along with the listed SOEs with available data. The null hypothesis is the performance means of the privatized companies 
are equal to the performance means of the SOEs. The alternative hypothesis is that the means are different (H0: μ1 = μ2; H1: μ1 ≠ 
μ2). The results were reported using Microsoft Excel software. 
 
 
The 2003 results show that once more none of the variables are statistically significant at a 5% 
level, except for the INEFF variable that can be barely considered significant at a 10%. 
 
For 2006, the results show a similar behaviour after the sample enlargement. The EBIT, ROS, 
ROA, and ROE differentials continue to be lower for privatized companies and not statistically 
significant at a 5%. Only the ROS is statistically significant at a 10% level. The remaining 
2003
Number of Privatized 
Companies Number of SOE Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 4 35576.000 233887.583 -1.297 0.132
ROS 2 4 -0.048 0.058 -1.062 0.183
ROA 2 4 0.003 0.001 0.083 0.471
ROE 2 4 0.029 -0.045 0.649 0.276
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 4 90.366 -250.127 1.125 0.171
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 4 0.003 63.718 -1.528 0.101
Employees (EMPL) 2 4 200.000 1242.917 -0.886 0.220
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 4 0.122 0.166 -0.428 0.349
2006
Number of Privatized 
Companies Number of SOE Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 5 49074.500 248439.400 -1.458 0.102
ROS 2 5 -0.020 0.060 -1.575 0.088
ROA 2 5 -0.005 0.000 -0.199 0.438
ROE 2 5 -0.018 0.048 -1.279 0.129
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 5 179.927 50.526 1.290 0.210
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 5 -0.200 81.911 -2.265 0.036
Employees (EMPL) 2 5 551.833 1233.533 -0.477 0.327
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 5 0.043 0.010 0.425 0.346
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variables are not statistically significant, except for INEFF, which decrease is statistically 
significant.  
 
The second approach used to compare the privatized firms and the SOEs is the relative 
differential approach (table 4). This measure can be viewed as the average growth rate of each 
variable.  
 
Table 4 - Relative Performance Differential Approach (performance comparison between privatized companies 














*This comparison between privatized companies and SOE is made using the relative performance differential (RPC). The relative 
differential approach requires the absolute accounting figures. The results were computed using the following:     
                      , where RPC is the absolute performance change,     is the mean performance of each variable in the post-
privatization period, and       the mean performance change of each variable in the pre-privatization period. It is used a t-test 
for paired samples, to compare the two samples. The samples are formed by the two companies privatized in 2003 and 2006 
along with the corresponding SOE that show similar total assets. The null hypothesis is the performance means of the privatized 
companies are equal to the performance means of SOE. The alternative hypothesis is that the means are different (H0: μ1 = μ2; 
H1: μ1 ≠ μ2). The results were reported using Microsoft Excel software. 
 
For the year 2003, all the variables of the privatized firms have a slower growth than the SOEs, 
except for the return on sales (ROS) and the sales per employee (SALEFF). The difference 
between the means, however, is not statistically significant at a 5% level.  
 
For 2006, the growth rate of the EBIT for the privatized companies is lower than the SOEs, as 
well as all the other profitability variables (ROS, ROA and ROE). The differences of the EBIT, 
ROS and ROA are statistically significant at a 5% level. Unlike in the previous period, the 
companies privatized in 2006 have slower sales per employee (SALEFF) growth rates than the 
SOEs. The EBIT per employee (INEFF), which is not statistically significant at 5% level, has a 
slower growth rate than that of the SOEs, and the growth of the number of employees (EMPL) 
increased for the privatized companies. Finally, the debt level over total assets (TDTA) has 
increased, in opposition to what was expected. 
2003 Number of Companies Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 0.286 1.050 -1.268 0.213
ROS 2 -0.113 -0.122 0.009 0.497
ROA 2 0.103 0.248 -1.862 0.157
ROE 2 0.483 0.610 -0.244 0.424
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 0.300 -0.165 1.267 0.213
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 0.284 0.706 -1.139 0.229
Employees (EMPL) 2 0.018 0.205 -1.021 0.247
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 0.573 1.530 -1.481 0.189
2006 Number of Companies Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 0.068 0.897 -1.745 0.166
ROS 2 -0.153 0.486 -5.503 0.057
ROA 2 -0.002 0.290 -48.223 0.007
ROE 2 -0.238 -0.030 -0.107 0.466
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 0.186 0.373 -0.578 0.333
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 -0.005 0.960 -2.790 0.110
Employees (EMPL) 2 0.046 -0.038 0.357 0.391
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 0.156 -0.663 1.980 0.149
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The results show that when comparing the performance of the privatized firms with similar 
size SOEs there is no statistically significant improvement identifiable. This means that, for 
these companies, the privatization process did not greatly benefit their performance.  
 
When performing the same test with a larger sample, the results (table 5) are similar for the 
year of 2003. All the variables are not statistically significant at a 5% level. This is consistent 
with the previous results. In 2006, however, the ROS and INEFF are statistically significant at 
5% level. These results are similar to those conducted with a smaller sample. With these 
results, there is evidence that the privatization process did not improve the companies’ 
performance.  
 
















*This comparison between privatized companies and SOE is made using the relative performance differential (RPC). The relative 
differential approach requires the absolute accounting figures. The results were computed using the following:     
                      , where RPC is the absolute performance change,     is the mean performance of each variable in the post-
privatization period, and       the mean performance change of each variable in the pre-privatization period. It is used a t-test to 
compare the two samples. The samples are formed by the two companies privatized in 2003 and 2006 along with the 
corresponding SOE that show similar total assets. The null hypothesis is the performance means of the privatized companies are 
equal to the performance means of SOE. The alternative hypothesis is that the means are different (H0: μ1 = μ2; H1: μ1 ≠ μ2). The 
results were reported using Microsoft Excel software. 
 
 
The comparison of pre and post privatization periods provides evidence of an increase in 
operational efficiency, notably in sales per employee. The comparison of privatized firms and 
the existing SOEs does not indicate any improvements after privatization. 





Number of Privatized 
Companies Number of SOE Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 4 0.286 0.550 -0.296 0.391
ROS 2 4 -0.113 -0.523 0.652 0.280
ROA 2 4 0.103 -0.327 0.658 0.273
ROE 2 4 0.483 7.324 -1.011 0.193
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 4 0.300 0.014 1.505 0.103
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 4 0.284 -0.042 0.442 0.341
Employees (EMPL) 2 4 0.018 0.434 -1.252 0.150
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 4 0.573 0.795 -0.422 0.351
2006
Number of Privatized 
Companies Number of SOE Mean Privatized Mean SOE T-statistic p-value
EBIT 2 5 0.068 0.826 -3.452 0.037
ROS 2 5 -0.153 0.317 -2.830 0.018
ROA 2 5 -0.002 0.097 -0.340 0.383
ROE 2 5 -0.238 0.040 -0.473 0.328
Sales per Employee  (SALEFF) 2 5 0.186 0.190 -0.029 0.489
EBIT per Employee (INEFF) 2 5 -0.005 0.559 -2.344 0.033
Employees (EMPL) 2 5 0.046 0.246 -0.734 0.258
Total Debt over Total Assets (TDTA) 2 5 0.156 -0.156 1.085 0.169
28 
 
3.2  Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis studies the influence of the capital structure on the performance of a 
company. 
 
3.2.1 The Expected Sign 
The SHARECON variable which represents the percentage of the biggest qualified position in 
each company is expected to have a positive sign as the biggest shareholder has interest in 
increasing the EPS. The PRIV variable is expected to have a positive sign, as the theory points 
to a performance improvement. The variable STATE can be positive if the state does not have 
special privileges and if it supports a market orientated view. A negative sign can, however, be 
expected if the state assumes an opposition position and is able to force a deviation from a 
market orientation view.  
The expected sign for the SIZE variable is ambiguous. It can be positive if after privatization 
there is an expansion of the business. However, if the borrowing conditions deteriorate and 
interest rates increase, smaller companies may be negatively affected and experience a 
reduction in the net profits. The IND variable is expected to have a positive sign due to a rise in 
the commodities prices. (McGuinness and Ferguson, 2005). 
The variable VOL is expected to have a positive sign because the investors tend to invest in 
companies that have good earnings per share. The NYSE variable is expected also to show a 
positive sign as the companies which perform better have a possibility of being considered to 
be listed on the New York stock indexes. (McGuinness and Ferguson, 2005). 
 
3.2.2 Result Analysis  
The model is used to provide a snapshot of the variables that influence the earnings per share 
(EPS) of the companies listed in the PSI 20 and IBEX 35, in two year intervals, starting in 2005 
(table 4). The results provide low R2 coefficients, meaning that the variables included do not 
























* The OLS regressions were made using the dependent variable earnings per share and explanatory variables SHARECON, PRIV, 
STATE, SIZE, VOL, IND, and NYSE. The p-value level used to determine the significance is 5%. The results were reported using 
Eviews 3.1 software. 
 
 
The p-value associated to F-statistic of the OLS regression for 2005 is 0.302 and thus, in its 
whole, there is not statistical significance at a 5% level. 
The results of 2005 show that the Shareholder Concentration (SHARECON) has a positive 
coefficient, meaning that an increase of majority shareholder’ capital increases the EPS. 
However, this variable proves not to be statistically significant at a 5% level, which leads to the 
conclusion that the share concentration does not influence the EPS. Another important factor 
studied is the influence of the privatization. As expected, the variable PRIV has a positive 
coefficient which indicates that the EPS, and therefore the performance, increases after 
privatization. In spite of this relation, this variable is not statistically significant at the 5% level, 
a factor which might indicate that the privatization of some of the companies present in the 
sample does not influence the EPS. 
The presence of the state as a shareholder is another factor which may influence the 
performance of a company. For 2005, the variable STATE has a negative coefficient. This, in 
line with was expected, indicates that if there is a state presence, the EPS tends to decrease. 
However, once more, the variable is not statistically significant, hence not being relevant in 
influencing the EPS. In regard to the SIZE variable, which represents the net profits of the 
previous year, the coefficient is positive and the variable is statistically significant at a 5% level. 
This result is consistent with what was expected, since the EPS incorporates the net profits and 
so proves to be a great influence on the EPS. The VOL variable that represents the yearly stock 
transaction volume has a negative coefficient and thus has a negative influence on the EPS. 
Contrary to what was expected, as the transactions increase the earnings per share tend to 
decrease. This variable is statistically significant at a 5% level.  It symbolizes the relevance of 
the stock market’s volatility impact on the EPS. The IND variable which identifies the industrial, 
construction and energy companies has a positive coefficient, as expected, which suggests that 
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic p-value Coefficient t-Statistic p-value Coefficient t-Statistic p-value
Constant 0,610 1,291 0,204 -3,328 -0,359 0,721 4,402 0,984 0,330
Shareholders 
Concentration (SHARECON) 0,084 0,105 0,917 -4,597 -0,288 0,775 -3,769 -0,498 0,621
Privatization (PRIV) 0,270 0,547 0,587 3,708 0,431 0,668 -2,352 -0,552 0,584
State as Shareholder (STATE) -0,204 -0,437 0,664 0,488 0,059 0,953 -1,890 -0,450 0,655
Net Profit of Previous Year (SIZE) 0,105 2,559 0,015 1,003 2,533 0,015 0,072 0,550 0,585
Stock Yearly
Transaction Volume (VOL) -0,324 -2,075 0,045 -2,033 -1,143 0,259 -0,396 -0,589 0,558
Industry, Construction, Energy (IND) 0,341 0,894 0,377 2,266 0,314 0,755 3,167 0,936 0,354
Listed in the NYSE (NYSE) -0,767 -0,975 0,336 13,698 0,823 0,415 0,145 0,018 0,986
R-squared 0,187 0,370 0,064
F-statistic 1,247 3,769 0,462
p-value 0,302 0,003 0,857




these companies have a tendency to increase the EPS as commodity price rises. The last 
variable is the NYSE that represents the companies that are listed on the Dow Jones or 
NASDAQ indexes. It has a negative coefficient and it is not statistically significant at a 5% level. 
Being listed on one of the New York indexes is not relevant to explain the EPS behaviour. This 
result is different from what was expected. Normally, being listed on the NYSE is a factor that 
attracts future investors. 
Since the regression is not statistically significant there cannot be concluded any influence to 
the EPS, despite the significance of individual variables. 
 
In 2007, the OLS regression is statically significant at a 5% level, registering a p-value of 0.003. 
The SHARECON variable also has a negative coefficient. In this year the shareholder capital 
concentration continues to negatively influence the EPS. It continues to contradict what was 
expected. Despite this relation, the variable is not statistically significant at a 5% level, which 
indicates that the EPS continues not to be influenced by the shareholders’ capital 
concentration. 
The PRIV variable, in 2007, has a positive coefficient, aligning its behaviour with the 
expectations. This confirms an increase in performance after privatization. However, since the 
variable is not statistically significant at a 5% level, one can conclude that in this case 
privatization does not influence the EPS. Contrary to 2005, the variable STATE has a positive 
influence on the EPS, but once more it is not statistically significant at a 5% level. This fact 
leads to a conclusion that in 2007 the presence of the state is not relevant in influencing the 
EPS. The net profits (SIZE) remains, like in 2005, statistically significant at a 5% level and 
positively influences the EPS. The VOL variable is not statistically significant at a 5% level. The 
coefficient is negative, as it was in 2005, which suggests that the transactions’ volume tends to 
decrease the EPS. The IND variable, opposing 2005, has a positive coefficient. This influence is 
corresponding to what was expected, showing that the increase of the commodity prices, 
which began in 2007, influences the EPS. Despite the positive influence, it is not strong enough 
as this variable is not statistically significant at a 5% level. Finally, the NYSE variable has a 
positive coefficient, reflecting the original expectations, but it remains not statistically 
significant at a 5% level and therefore being listed in the New York indexes does not influence 
the EPS. 
 
For 2009, the OLS regression is not statistically significant at a 5% level (F-statistic’s p-value of 
0.833) and the R2, as shown on table 6, is close to 0. The SHARECON variable continues to have 
a negative coefficient, confirming once more that a higher qualified position in the capital 
structure reduces the EPS, in opposition to what was expected. The PRIV variable, for this year, 
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shows a negative coefficient, differing from what was seen in the previous periods and from 
what was expected. The STATE variable, like in 2005, has a negative coefficient, decreasing the 
EPS if the State’s stake in the companies increases. The SIZE variable, once more, has a positive 
coefficient, although lower than in previous periods. The VOL variable continues showing a 
negative coefficient, highlighting once more the apparent EPS decrease with a higher 
transaction volume, contrary to what was expected. The IND variable remains positive as in 
previous years, as expected, and the NYSE variable also remains positive.  In spite of these 
interactions, none of the variables are statistically significant at a 5% level or at a 10% level. 
The low R2 suggests that none of the variables used explain the behaviour of the EPS do so, 
and one tends to conclude that other factors not present in the model may provide a better 
explanation. 
 
Additionally, it was introduced another dummy variable expressing the company’s nationality 
(PORT), being 1 if the companies were Portuguese and 0 if the companies were Spanish. This 
variable is introduced to see if the performance is affected by the country in which it is listed. 
The results are shown in table 7. 
 

















* The OLS regressions were made using the dependent variable earnings per share and explanatory variables SHARECON, PRIV, 
STATE, SIZE, VOL, IND, NYSE and PORT. The p-value level used to determine the significance is 5%. The results were reported 
using Eviews 3.1 software. 
 
The results are similar to the ones obtained using the original model. In 2005, the R2 increases 
slightly but the p-value associated to the regression F-statistic remains higher than the 5% 
level, which makes it not statistically significant. The only variables statistically significant are 




Coefficient t-Statistic p-value Coefficient t-Statistic p-value Coefficient t-Statistic p-value
Constant 0.846 1.809 0.079 -3.879 -0.407 0.686 5.611 1.236 0.223
Shareholders 
Concentration (SHARECON) 0.237 0.306 0.762 -5.107 -0.315 0.754 -3.112 -0.413 0.682
Privatization (PRIV) 0.052 0.108 0.915 3.738 0.430 0.669 -2.378 -0.562 0.577
State as Shareholder (STATE) -0.001 -0.003 0.997 0.016 0.002 0.999 -1.155 -0.274 0.785
Net Profit of Previous Year (SIZE) 0.079 1.930 0.061 1.057 2.422 0.020 0.033 0.253 0.801
Stock Yearly
Transaction Volume (VOL) -0.279 -1.838 0.074 -2.196 -1.173 0.247 -0.338 -0.506 0.615
Industry, Construction, Energy (IND) 0.444 1.202 0.237 1.992 0.272 0.787 3.389 1.008 0.319
Listed in the NYSE (NYSE) -0.212 -0.265 0.793 12.802 0.750 0.457 0.396 0.050 0.960
Nationality (PORT) -0.782 -2.055 0.047 2.247 0.311 0.758 -4.089 -1.288 0.204
R-squared 0.270 0.371 0.097
F-statistic 1.711 3.244 0.617
p-value 0.128 0.005 0.759




For 2007, the results are identical to those found earlier. The R2 is 0,371, the higher of the 
three years, and the p-value associated to the regression F-statistic is below the 5% level, 
therefore making it statistically significant. The variables are all not statistically significant, 
except for the SIZE variable which is the only influencing the EPS. 
 
In 2009, the R2 remains near 0 and the regression is not statistically significant at a 5% level. 
The p-value associated to the F-statistic is 0,759. All the variables are not statistically 
significant. 
 
Taking only the results of 2007 (the only regression statistically significant) into account, there 
is a significant positive relation between the net income and the earnings per share. In 
addition, there seems to be a slight negative association between capital structure and the 
earnings per share and a positive association with the privatization process. However these 
last two indications are not strong enough, as both variables are not statistically significant. 
These results were unable to provide the same conclusions of McGuinness and Ferguson when 
studying the Chinese markets. 
 
The results may differ from what was originally expected because the years used correspond 
to the beggining of the financial crisis, which had a negative influence on the 
companies’results. Another factor that could have affected the results is the fact that only 
listed companies were studied. Therefore, both privatized and SOEs (companies with the state 
as a shareholder) have to be similarly organized and follow the same set of rules set by the 
















This study was conducted to determine whether the performance of privatized SOEs in 
Portugal and Spain improved after privatization, and to determine if the capital structure 
influenced such improvements. 
 
The comparison of the years before and after privatization provides evidence that the 
differences of many indicators are not statistically significant. In 2003, apart from the sales per 
employee and the debt level, none of the differences are statistically significant. In 2006 
however, there is no statistical significance increase in any variable for the privatized 
companies.  When comparing the performance of privatized with that of the existing SOEs, the 
results confirm that there is no statistical significant increase performance.  
With these results, it can be concluded that there are only greater improvements within the 
company, at an efficiency level, rather than performance improvements.  
 
When analysing the influence of the capital structure on the performance of a company the 
results were very clear in denying such an association. Using the companies listed on the 
Portuguese and Spanish stock markets, there seems to be evidence that capital structure and 
the presence of the state as a shareholder does not influence the performance. 
 
From the results, it can be inferred that, for the Portuguese and Spanish privatized companies 
during the last decade, there is not a significant increase in performance, but rather an 
increase in efficiency of some of the operational areas. 
 
 
4.1   Limitations and Future Studies 
 
This study has the limitation of being based on a small sample, when analysing the first 
hypothesis, which limits the interpretations and conclusions drawn. However, it constitutes a 
contribution to the research of the privatization’s impact in Portugal and Spain and can be a 
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